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The Story behind the Infosys Buyback

[Apurva Lahoti is pursuing the Master of Laws (LLM) programme from WBNUJS Kolkata.] The expression ‘buyback of shares’ simply refers to an activity wherein the corporate entity takes back its issued shares from its shareholders pursuant to section 68 of the Companies Act, 2013 (Act). By virtue of the said provision, not only public but also private companies can purchase their own issued securities from the following three sources: free reserves; securities premium account; and proceeds of the issue of any securities.[1] This buyback shall be lawful provided the company is permitted to do so by its articles and fulfills all the requirements as mandated by section 68 read with the Companies (

Analysing the Contours of Masala Bonds

[Aman Gupta is a third-year student at NLU Jodhpur.] In 2015, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) introduced a new kind of external commercial borrowings (ECBs), known as rupee-denominated bonds (RDBs) or masala bonds, which were floated with the idea of aiding the Indian corporate to raise funds from global investors.[1] The RDBs were conceptualised as an attempt to internationalise the Indian rupee with the objective of ensuring a stable currency and also attracting off-shore investors. The first ever masala bond of ₹1000 crores was issued by the International Finance Corporation (IFC) in 2013 to fund infrastructural projects in India. Since then, various Indian companies such as HDFC, NHAI an

De-coding section 29 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016

[Dushyant Kishan Kaul is a fourth-year student at Jindal Global Law School.] In the recently decided case of ArcelorMittal India Private Limited v. Satish Kumar Gupta & Ors., the Supreme Court has interpreted section 29 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (Code) to determine the conditions of eligibility of resolution applicants under the Code. The section helps serve an important object of the Code, which is to disallow those who do not meet the specified criteria from submitting a resolution plan. This is crucial to ensure that such unfit applicants do not take charge of the concerned corporate debtor and its assets. A bench comprising of Justice R.F. Nariman and Justice Indu Malho

The Problem of Non-Performing Assets in the Power Sector: ‘Brighter’ Times Ahead?

[Moksh Ranawat and Aman Guru are students at Symbiosis Law School, Pune.] The problem of non-performing assets (NPAs) in the power sector holds potential to disrupt the banking industry of the country and has become a major reason for reduction in the lending capacity of banks. Five sectors alone account for around 60% of NPAs in the Indian economy - steel, power, telecom, infrastructure and textile sectors. Out of these, the power sector is responsible for 35% of the NPAs and stressed assets of the banking industry. On March 7, 2018, the Standing Committee on Energy chaired by Dr. Kambhampati Haribabu submitted a report according to which the NPAs in the power sector stood at a staggering t

Regulation of Consent Mechanism: An analysis of the latest SEBI (Settlement Proceedings) Regulations

[Riya Gupta is a fifth-year student at Jindal Global Law School.] The Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) introduced a settlement mechanism for violation of securities laws in India in the year 2007.[1] Later, in 2014, the SEBI (Settlement of Administrative and Civil Proceedings) Regulations, 2014 (Settlement Regulations 2014) were notified[2] with the view to bringing in certainty of legal enforceability in the system. However, over a period, certain loopholes were noticed within the functioning of SEBI and the settlement regulations which hindered its effective implementation. It was noticed that (a) certain applicants were prevented from settling securities violation in cases wh

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