The question is not whether finfluencers should be regulated; since December 2024, they are. The question is which of SEBI's two licensing regimes was chosen, and whether the protection inside it reaches the people carrying the risk.

While the amended regulations fill in the gaps of digital governance, eligibility criteria for startups, inadequate disclosures, and angel investing reform in a comprehensive way, these amendments' success will depend on reconciling 3 conflicts: the mandatory dematerialisation of the foreign entities, moral hazard created by increased eligibility criteria, and concentration of the capital pool within a thin accreditation base.

On 10 August 2026, the Department of Debt and Hybrid Securities of the Securities and Exchange Board of India released a consultation paper proposing, alongside an expansion of ISIN limits for privately placed debt, to dispense with the obligation on an issuer entering the listed debt market for the first time to also list its outstanding unlisted non-convertible debt securities issued on or after 1 January 2024.

The article proposes that SEBI amend the PPM template under Annexure 1 of the master circular for AIFs to prescribe minimum standards governing default identification, consequences, and the routing of default proceeds.

India does not have one disclosure gap above Tata Sons. It has two disclosure regimes that were each built to answer a different question; company law asks who controls, securities law asks what happened. Neither could have been possibly designed having a multi-tier, trust-controlled, unlisted promoter sitting above a listed group in mind.

The central thesis: India has a statutory answer for retail investors stranded inside a single insolvent asset-holding company; it has simply never been asked whether that answer was built wide enough to reach this particular investor.

The AIF industry is quite significant and permitting a system that allows conflicted manager to influence deals for their own profit is detrimental. SEBI can easily avoid this by applying the existing rules which govern REITs and InvITs to AIFs alongside the other reforms proposed in this blog.

The IFSCA's January 2026 consultation paper is a meaningful first step toward building a credible algorithmic trading framework for GIFT IFSC. However, a framework that privatises oversight to commercial exchanges and leaves third party harm without a clear legal remedy is not yet fit for the ambitions it is meant to serve.

The March 2026 Amendments can be best understood as a refinement of lock-in regulations rather than a reform of pledge law.

A credible securities regulatory regime derives its authority not from the severity of its penalties, but from their predictability, coherence, and constitutional legitimacy.

SIF was introduced for investors who needed more flexibility than the retail MF without the institutional minimum of PMS. But the regulation has several structural problems.

This blog examines whether a prospectus forward-looking statement regime can act as a corrective framework to India’s information asymmetry problem.

GARUDA is a well-designed and largely welcome structural reform. Its concerns are real, and practitioners advising on AIF launches should not treat the new regime as risk-free simply because it is faster.

The four March 2026 reforms are all justified in their own right. The SPV amendment addresses a real compliance issue.

Terrascope settles an important question and should be welcomed for reinforcing transparency as a foundational norm of securities regulation.

The cancellation of Elite Investment Advisory Services’ registration is a proportionate and well-reasoned enforcement outcome. However, the order inadvertently surfaces a regulatory design problem that deserves attention in its own right.

The December 2025 PFRDA circular and SEBI's 2025 AIF reforms together represent a meaningful, even if incomplete, step towards integrating India's pension and alternative investment ecosystems.

The Section 230 arbitrage is not a design defect in either statute. SEBI’s framework assumes direct contractual transactions within its jurisdiction.

This piece argues the need for remedial measures in the (eventual) backdrop of increasing number of MFDs (may or may not be SEBI registered) acting as advisory agents enjoying continued inclination of retail investor sentiment, to uphold investor intent and ease while balancing SEBI’s protective tendency.

What is left is the more difficult doctrinal task of defining where the illegality-irregularity line lies in less extreme situations, of offering a legitimate way of genuine fund-use variation in private placements, and of calibrating the range of the affected class of stakeholders.

The paper is a significant step towards making the “fit and proper person” criteria more balanced and fairer. However, its triumph depends on how SEBI exercises its discretion.

Through the order, SEBI clarified that entities in purely advisory or consultative roles are not required to register as a Merchant Banker under Section 12(1) of the SEBI Act. This clarification, grounded in regulatory acquiescence and established market practice, provides meaningful relief to advisors who have operated without assuming issue management responsibilities.

Market integrity regulation is invariably faced with a dilemma of how far precautionary provisions can be stretched until there exists a possibility of punitive action against a behavior not yet found to have occurred.

The article focuses on key aspects surrounding the impending listing of the National Stock Exchange and its implications for companies and investors in the Indian capital market.