The article proposes that SEBI amend the PPM template under Annexure 1 of the master circular for AIFs to prescribe minimum standards governing default identification, consequences, and the routing of default proceeds.

The RBI already has everything it needs for the purpose. It has a standalone control test; policy authority sitting with DPIIT; and administrative authority over the rules. All it needs is for one specific lacuna to be filled, namely, who takes charge in case of conflicting or inconsistent sector-specific interpretations of the control tests.

India does not have one disclosure gap above Tata Sons. It has two disclosure regimes that were each built to answer a different question; company law asks who controls, securities law asks what happened. Neither could have been possibly designed having a multi-tier, trust-controlled, unlisted promoter sitting above a listed group in mind.

The AIF industry is quite significant and permitting a system that allows conflicted manager to influence deals for their own profit is detrimental. SEBI can easily avoid this by applying the existing rules which govern REITs and InvITs to AIFs alongside the other reforms proposed in this blog.

The IFSCA's January 2026 consultation paper is a meaningful first step toward building a credible algorithmic trading framework for GIFT IFSC. However, a framework that privatises oversight to commercial exchanges and leaves third party harm without a clear legal remedy is not yet fit for the ambitions it is meant to serve.

The author argues for the legal recognition and protection of vested but unexercised ESOPs by characterising them as accrued economic entitlements that should not be retrospectively impaired during acquisition transactions.

This piece argues that the manner in which Section 240C has been drafted is more than just an ordinary administrative delegation and can lead to the delegation of the essential legislative function.

The Corporate Laws (Amendment) Bill of 2026 introduced a structural change. It resulted in a decrease in the required approval from 90% to 75% for fast track mergers based on member and creditor votes. This is meant to streamline corporate restructuring, but it also causes worry about protecting minority shareholders.

The March 2026 Amendments can be best understood as a refinement of lock-in regulations rather than a reform of pledge law.

India’s CSR law leaves an entire dimension of corporate responsibility unaddressed. Responsibility laundering is a foreseeable product of a statute that regulates charity while ignoring conduct.

A credible securities regulatory regime derives its authority not from the severity of its penalties, but from their predictability, coherence, and constitutional legitimacy.

The consent portability problem and the successor liability lacuna are not just peripheral inconsistencies; instead, they constitute structural gaps that must be corrected.

SIF was introduced for investors who needed more flexibility than the retail MF without the institutional minimum of PMS. But the regulation has several structural problems.

This blog examines whether a prospectus forward-looking statement regime can act as a corrective framework to India’s information asymmetry problem.

GARUDA is a well-designed and largely welcome structural reform. Its concerns are real, and practitioners advising on AIF launches should not treat the new regime as risk-free simply because it is faster.

Pannalal's blueprint has two structural failures firstly, no mandatory independent valuation for selective Section 66 reductions, and secondly, no genuine price discovery when those reductions target only public shareholders.

The four March 2026 reforms are all justified in their own right. The SPV amendment addresses a real compliance issue.

Terrascope settles an important question and should be welcomed for reinforcing transparency as a foundational norm of securities regulation.

The continued exclusion of FOCCs, the rigid profitability and control thresholds, the ambiguity around “long-term strategic investment,” and the uncertainty surrounding InvIT structures and offshore exposure caps together narrow the practical scope of the reform.

The cancellation of Elite Investment Advisory Services’ registration is a proportionate and well-reasoned enforcement outcome. However, the order inadvertently surfaces a regulatory design problem that deserves attention in its own right.

The December 2025 PFRDA circular and SEBI's 2025 AIF reforms together represent a meaningful, even if incomplete, step towards integrating India's pension and alternative investment ecosystems.

The Section 230 arbitrage is not a design defect in either statute. SEBI’s framework assumes direct contractual transactions within its jurisdiction.

This piece argues the need for remedial measures in the (eventual) backdrop of increasing number of MFDs (may or may not be SEBI registered) acting as advisory agents enjoying continued inclination of retail investor sentiment, to uphold investor intent and ease while balancing SEBI’s protective tendency.

What is left is the more difficult doctrinal task of defining where the illegality-irregularity line lies in less extreme situations, of offering a legitimate way of genuine fund-use variation in private placements, and of calibrating the range of the affected class of stakeholders.