The March 2026 Amendments can be best understood as a refinement of lock-in regulations rather than a reform of pledge law.

India’s CSR law leaves an entire dimension of corporate responsibility unaddressed. Responsibility laundering is a foreseeable product of a statute that regulates charity while ignoring conduct.

A credible securities regulatory regime derives its authority not from the severity of its penalties, but from their predictability, coherence, and constitutional legitimacy.

The consent portability problem and the successor liability lacuna are not just peripheral inconsistencies; instead, they constitute structural gaps that must be corrected.

SIF was introduced for investors who needed more flexibility than the retail MF without the institutional minimum of PMS. But the regulation has several structural problems.

This blog examines whether a prospectus forward-looking statement regime can act as a corrective framework to India’s information asymmetry problem.

GARUDA is a well-designed and largely welcome structural reform. Its concerns are real, and practitioners advising on AIF launches should not treat the new regime as risk-free simply because it is faster.

Pannalal's blueprint has two structural failures firstly, no mandatory independent valuation for selective Section 66 reductions, and secondly, no genuine price discovery when those reductions target only public shareholders.

The four March 2026 reforms are all justified in their own right. The SPV amendment addresses a real compliance issue.

Terrascope settles an important question and should be welcomed for reinforcing transparency as a foundational norm of securities regulation.

The continued exclusion of FOCCs, the rigid profitability and control thresholds, the ambiguity around “long-term strategic investment,” and the uncertainty surrounding InvIT structures and offshore exposure caps together narrow the practical scope of the reform.

The cancellation of Elite Investment Advisory Services’ registration is a proportionate and well-reasoned enforcement outcome. However, the order inadvertently surfaces a regulatory design problem that deserves attention in its own right.

The December 2025 PFRDA circular and SEBI's 2025 AIF reforms together represent a meaningful, even if incomplete, step towards integrating India's pension and alternative investment ecosystems.

The Section 230 arbitrage is not a design defect in either statute. SEBI’s framework assumes direct contractual transactions within its jurisdiction.

This piece argues the need for remedial measures in the (eventual) backdrop of increasing number of MFDs (may or may not be SEBI registered) acting as advisory agents enjoying continued inclination of retail investor sentiment, to uphold investor intent and ease while balancing SEBI’s protective tendency.

What is left is the more difficult doctrinal task of defining where the illegality-irregularity line lies in less extreme situations, of offering a legitimate way of genuine fund-use variation in private placements, and of calibrating the range of the affected class of stakeholders.

The paper is a significant step towards making the “fit and proper person” criteria more balanced and fairer. However, its triumph depends on how SEBI exercises its discretion.

Through the order, SEBI clarified that entities in purely advisory or consultative roles are not required to register as a Merchant Banker under Section 12(1) of the SEBI Act. This clarification, grounded in regulatory acquiescence and established market practice, provides meaningful relief to advisors who have operated without assuming issue management responsibilities.

Market integrity regulation is invariably faced with a dilemma of how far precautionary provisions can be stretched until there exists a possibility of punitive action against a behavior not yet found to have occurred.

The article focuses on key aspects surrounding the impending listing of the National Stock Exchange and its implications for companies and investors in the Indian capital market.

The Circular eases barriers to entry and rationalised procedures by aligning capital markets in India with global best practices, and facilitated efficiency without compromising regulation. However, regulatory trust cannot exist in a vacuum. The lack of well-defined eligibility criteria, long compliance periods with the lack of well-established event monitoring, and the overdependence on intermediaries also create the issues of arbitrariness, supervisory dilution, and fragmen

The SMC signifies a progressive initiative to update India’s securities market by consolidating different acts into a single statute. If successfully adopted, the code will rewrite the securities market in India, redefining legislation, enforcement, and the investor experience.

To ensure that AI is implemented effectively, organizations must assess possible bias and inaccurate data prior to deploying the AI system.

The main thesis of this article is not as broad as that, which is that the increase of the powers of SEBI under the SMC has not been offset by a corresponding increase in the supply of institutional checks to those powers.