The balancing or “sliding scale” approach in Sequana is necessarily indeterminate, but such flexibility is preferable in the sphere of directors’ duties.

It is time for tax laws to stop dragging MSMEs back into the quicksand if insolvency is supposed to provide them with a new beginning.

The IBC amendment marks a significant step in India’s insolvency law. By introducing CIIRP, Parliament has signaled a shift towards even greater creditor empowerment and flexibility. CIIRP’s shorter timelines and creditor-led design mirror global best practices (akin to pre-packaged restructurings), potentially speeding up resolutions and preserving value.

Zombie companies drain capital from healthy firms and undermine policy tools. India's shift toward strict enforcement is beginning to bear fruit, but ongoing vigilance, strict identification of NPs, strong insolvency procedures, and a strong banking culture are required to prevent credit from pushing zombies rather than innovation.

The ‘nil’ payment paradox, starkly illustrated in the case of Vadraj Cement Limited, is more than just a procedural flaw; it is a fundamental breach of the very promise made by IBC upon its enactment, which is the revival of businesses and equitable treatment of all the stakeholders. 

The NCLAT’s ruling, though doctrinally clear, exposes a structural vulnerability: the potential for disguised preferences routed through third parties. India’s insolvency regime must evolve beyond formalism.

IBC gets very few opportunities to realize its true objectives, that of revival of financially distressed entities and their continuity as a going concern. In order to prevent the IBC from turning into a debt-recovery tool, it is essential to re-evaluate the Bill in light of the principles upon which the IBC is premised.

The Bill's establishment of group insolvency and cross-border insolvency frameworks is significant as it illustrates India's evolution as a sophisticated player in the global insolvency sector.

India lacks a formal mechanism to address cross-border insolvency and restructuring. In practice, resolution of such matter’s hinges on ad hoc court-to-court cooperation or the recognition of foreign judgments under the Civil Procedure Code 1908.

The need of the hour is a legislative and administrative framework that balances conflicting objectives. India's dual objectives of preventing financial misconduct and creating an insolvency regime that is investment-friendly can only be fully supported by such an integrated approach.

While the regulation has the potential to facilitate faster and more value-maximizing outcomes, the lack of statutory guidance and procedural safeguards could inadvertently undermine the IBC’s foundational objectives.

The doctrinal tension at the core is between IBC's asset maximization aim and DPDP Act's rights-oriented approach focused on user consent and purpose limitation. The lack of legislative clarity poses the threat of privacy invasions, regulatory breaches, and user trust loss.

IBC’s objectives of focusing on time-bound resolution and asset maximization must be reconciled with the DPDP Act’s mandate to respect informational self-determination.

The IBBI has realized the value of market-driven resolution which it has effectively pivoted towards. The timing of the notification of these amendments must also be appreciated. India is notoriously a slow insolvency jurisdiction, and such perceptions can seriously damage credit availability in markets.

The pre-pack insolvency framework was crafted with the best of intentions. It aimed to protect MSMEs from the procedural weight of CIRP while ensuring that their businesses could be salvaged quickly and quietly. But in practice, it remains a tool too complex, too exclusive, and too disconnected from how MSMEs actually function.