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From Counting to Judging: TOLA and the Offshore Fund Safe Harbour

Writer: Pankaj Singh Karki
Pankaj Singh Karki
1 hour ago
7 min read

[Pankaj is a student at Chanakya National Law University.]


An offshore fund resident in a country that has a double tax avoidance agreement with India, with Indian residents owning less than 5% of the corpus, appoints an eligible fund manager in India. The manager then nominates a director to an Indian portfolio company, and another advisor, not a fund manager, negotiates the financing. The three objective conditions for safe harbour as prescribed in Schedule I of the Income-tax Act 2025 (residence, treaty status and 5% limit on Indian holding) are met by the fund. The question is when the activity of the manager ceases to be protected fund management and becomes proof of the control or management of business in India by the fund itself. 


Previously, under Section 9(12) of the Income-tax Act 2025, fund management activity in India did not establish a business connection if it satisfied the 13 conditions specified in the old Schedule I. Two were related to conduct. The Taxation and Other Laws (Amendment) Act 2026 (TOLA), which was assented to on 17 August 2026, and is deemed to have come into force on 1 April 2026, introduces five conditions in place of the old Schedule I. It deletes eight objective conditions and keeps both conduct conditions.


The old regime already contained standards. Instead, TOLA transitions from a multi-layered system (where conduct conditions co-existed with objective tests) to a system where those conditions play a much greater role in determining who is eligible. 


Before TOLA: A Layered Architecture


The old Schedule I contained numerous structural and numerical conditions. The fund and its activities had to be subject to investor protection regulation in its home jurisdiction. It also required a minimum of 25 unconnected members, restricted member participation, and required a minimum monthly average corpus of INR 100 crore. These conditions turned whether a fund was genuinely pooled and managed at arm’s-length into questions answerable from documents.


The old Schedule also contained two conditions of a different kind. Clause (k) said the fund must not carry on or control and manage, directly or indirectly, any business in India. Clause (l) said the fund must not itself be engaged in any activity constituting a business connection in India, or have any person acting on its behalf whose activities constitute a business connection, other than the eligible fund manager’s activities. Neither can be determined by counting.


What TOLA Changes


The substituted Schedule I contains five conditions for the fund: residence, treaty or notified-jurisdiction status, the 5% cap on Indian involvement, and two conduct conditions. The first three are objective. Clauses (d) and (e) are conduct-based.


First, clause (d) (formerly (k)) is reproduced word for word. Clause (e) (formerly (l)) is narrowed. The old clause had two questions: Was the fund itself doing anything that created a business connection in India, and were people acting for the fund doing so? Clause (e) only requires the second. The first does not get picked up by clause (d) which asks a narrower question – is the fund operating a business in India, or controlling and managing a business in India? Thus, the fund's own operations no longer deprive it of the safe harbour. However, the safe harbour only protects the management of the funds through the eligible manager. Other activity of the fund remains subject to the ordinary business connection rules.


Second, Parliament did not substitute the deleted structural conditions with more detailed conduct rules. It did not specify when a negotiation or board representation would constitute business activities or control. It matters because now the two conduct clauses bear more weight in determining eligibility: the manager must determine whether board seats or negotiations fall within the safe harbour before investing in the India activity of the fund; if the manager gets it wrong, the investment becomes subject to the ordinary business-connection rules.


Clause (d): Carrying on, or controlling and managing, a business


Clause (d) contains two variables. The first is the phrase ‘directly or indirectly’, which extends the clause to influence exercised through other persons. The second is what constitutes a ‘business in India’, which for a fund will usually concern an investee company’s business rather than its own investment activity.


Does a manager nominating a director to the board of an investee company amount to indirectly controlling and managing the company’s business? This cannot be answered directly based on Rule 274(3) of the Income-tax Rules 2026. It is framed by reference to the fund's holding, treating a fund as controlling or managing a business where it holds more than 26% of the share capital, voting power or interest in the entity, and it says nothing about board nomination rights. It also remains tied to old clause (k) and its applicability to clause (d) remains unclear. If it does, a fund that does not exceed 26% will not be subject to the deeming rule, but clause (d) will still require a factual determination of the nature of the rights through which control is exercised. Similar to the right to appoint a majority of the directors or key managers, or to veto the budget or business plan, rather than protective rights (such as information, anti-dilution and exit rights).


Clause (e): activity by a person acting on the fund’s behalf


There is another attribution problem raised by clause (e). It contains three questions: (i) is it connected with the person conducting the business on behalf of the fund; (ii) does it form a business connection as per Section 9; and (iii) does the fund manager carve-out apply to it? Think of an advisor who negotiates financing in the opening example. Section 9 could treat the adviser's role to be a business connection if the adviser is regularly involved in concluding contracts or plays a principal role in the conclusion of contracts. The difficulty is attribution: the fund can use third parties, but the exemption depends on distinguishing fund-management activities from activities connected with a business connection.


Section 9 and the attribution of fund activities


The second question in clause (e) is whether an activity that is not performed by an eligible fund manager amounts to a business connection under Section 9. Section 9 applies to business conducted by a person through whom the non-resident habitually exercises authority to bind him/her to conclude contracts or habitually performs the principal role in the business's conclusion (where the contracts are of the kind specified). Does not reach an agent of independent status working in the ordinary course of its business, but an agent working principally or exclusively for the non-resident or for related non-residents is not deemed independent. In addition, the Supreme Court in CIT v. RD Aggarwal & Co found that the Indian activity must have been in actual and close contact with the non-resident's business, must have been continuous and must be a substantial contributor to its profits (see also Carborundum Co v. CIT). This may or may not be the case in each situation. This framework is for deciding if an Indian activity is a business connection but it does not clarify how fund-management activities will be assessed. Take an Indian adviser, independent of the fund manager, who negotiates terms with an investee company and contributes to the fund's profits without carrying on the fund's business in India. The independent status exception asks the right questions: does the adviser operate in the usual course of its own business or does it operate primarily or substantially for this fund or for related funds? The case law and Section 9 do not provide an indication of how those questions are answered in fund structures. Clause (e) does not either.


The Rules Still Reflect the Old Architecture


If the centre of gravity has moved towards conduct, the rules should have followed. As at the date of writing, Rule 274 has not been amended. 


Rule 274(2)(a) poses a more focused issue. It provides a temporary cure period for non-fulfilment of paragraphs 1(1)(c), (d) and (e). Under the old schedule, these included the 5% participation test, investor-protection regulation and the 25-member requirement. The mismatch is important because some of the provisions are based on conditions that no longer exist. The substituted paragraph 1(1)(c) itself provides a four-month cure for the 5% cap, but (d) and (e) carry no equivalent, which suggests the law treats only the participation limit as curable. If interpreted literally, the provision may thus seem to allow for a temporary violation of a conduct condition. It shows the issue at large: the machinery reflects an architecture that TOLA has significantly altered.


What a Conduct-Based Safe Harbour Usually Needs


The United Kingdom is a useful comparator because, like India, it uses conduct-based tests to determine whether a non-resident fund can claim the investment manager safe harbour. The exemption (ITA 2007 s 835M; CTA 2010 s 1146)  requires, among other things, that the manager acts independently and in the ordinary course of its business. HM Revenue & Customs makes this predictable by providing published guidance. The independence test looks at the legal, financial and commercial characteristics of the relationship (INTM269060), and a further measurable proxy applies: services to the non-resident and connected persons are not a substantial part of the manager's business where they stay within 50% for periods beginning on or after 1 January 2026 (INTM269090).


India does not have to follow the same path. The Central Board of Direct Taxes (CBDT) can prescribe administrative guidance, which India already has statutory powers to give under Paragraph 1(4) of the substituted Schedule, but that power has not yet been used specifically to clarify clauses (d) and (e).


Conclusion


TOLA changes the approach that a fund must take to secure the safe harbour. Eligibility, once determined by checking the number of members, the corpus and structure of a fund has to now take into account how the board seat, negotiation or third-party involvement will be treated under Section 9. That answer will, in many cases, be dependent on CBDT guidance, if issued, and ultimately on the courts' interpretation. The rules and forms must also be amended to reflect the substituted schedule. The control and management condition has been moved to amended Schedule I clause (d) and Rule 274 refers to the provisions of paragraph 1(1)(k) of the old schedule; Form 173 cites paragraph 1(4), which TOLA moved to paragraph 1(3). The question this article began with, when a manager's activity stops being protected fund management, therefore turns on facts such as the rights attached to a board seat and the independence of any adviser, and until guidance is issued it can only be judged case by case.


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©2025 by The Indian Review of Corporate and Commercial Laws.

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