The ‘nil’ payment paradox, starkly illustrated in the case of Vadraj Cement Limited, is more than just a procedural flaw; it is a fundamental breach of the very promise made by IBC upon its enactment, which is the revival of businesses and equitable treatment of all the stakeholders. 

The NCLAT’s ruling, though doctrinally clear, exposes a structural vulnerability: the potential for disguised preferences routed through third parties. India’s insolvency regime must evolve beyond formalism.

IBC gets very few opportunities to realize its true objectives, that of revival of financially distressed entities and their continuity as a going concern. In order to prevent the IBC from turning into a debt-recovery tool, it is essential to re-evaluate the Bill in light of the principles upon which the IBC is premised.

The Bill's establishment of group insolvency and cross-border insolvency frameworks is significant as it illustrates India's evolution as a sophisticated player in the global insolvency sector.

India lacks a formal mechanism to address cross-border insolvency and restructuring. In practice, resolution of such matter’s hinges on ad hoc court-to-court cooperation or the recognition of foreign judgments under the Civil Procedure Code 1908.

The need of the hour is a legislative and administrative framework that balances conflicting objectives. India's dual objectives of preventing financial misconduct and creating an insolvency regime that is investment-friendly can only be fully supported by such an integrated approach.

While the regulation has the potential to facilitate faster and more value-maximizing outcomes, the lack of statutory guidance and procedural safeguards could inadvertently undermine the IBC’s foundational objectives.

The doctrinal tension at the core is between IBC's asset maximization aim and DPDP Act's rights-oriented approach focused on user consent and purpose limitation. The lack of legislative clarity poses the threat of privacy invasions, regulatory breaches, and user trust loss.

IBC’s objectives of focusing on time-bound resolution and asset maximization must be reconciled with the DPDP Act’s mandate to respect informational self-determination.

The IBBI has realized the value of market-driven resolution which it has effectively pivoted towards. The timing of the notification of these amendments must also be appreciated. India is notoriously a slow insolvency jurisdiction, and such perceptions can seriously damage credit availability in markets.

The pre-pack insolvency framework was crafted with the best of intentions. It aimed to protect MSMEs from the procedural weight of CIRP while ensuring that their businesses could be salvaged quickly and quietly. But in practice, it remains a tool too complex, too exclusive, and too disconnected from how MSMEs actually function.

India’s unique structure makes both asset-wise bids and DIP financing hard to pull off. Courts and regulators have shown the law can support flexible sales and super-priority finance, but operationally, every step bumps into entrenched obstacles.

[ Apeksha is a student at National University of Study and Research in Law. ] The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code 2016  ( IBC ) was...

The proposal, if accepted, will provide a fillip to exploring mediation in other aspects of insolvency. While insolvency mediation is an intricate issue, proactive proposals will facilitate stakeholder dialogue and aid in resolving inconsistencies.

The IBBI’s 2025 amendments significantly improve India’s insolvency framework by making it more aligned with global best practices.

The Bhushan Power case will be studied as a cautionary tale. On one side, it underscores that insolvency laws are not toy models to be treated lightly; procedural rules serve the code’s integrity. On the other, it delivers a jolt by showing that even long-implemented deals can be unwound for technical lapses, a double-edged signal to investors and professionals alike.

The divergent fate of Byju’s-Aakash and BPSL indicate the increasing complexities of corporate restructuring in India, where the inflexible requirements of statutory compliance frequently come into conflict with the exigencies of business rescue.

Although the Supreme Court of India’s decision has garnered significant criticism, it is not without its merits. It emphasizes how the integrity of the insolvency process must remain sacred. The IBC transcends the role of a simple debt recovery mechanism; it is a framework rooted in legal principles and the equitable treatment of all stakeholders involved.

In this article, the author identifies two major challenges revealed by the impugned judgments: lack of a statutory time limit to implement resolution plans and imprecise role of monitoring committees in ensuring implementation of resolution plans.

The reverse CIRP model remains judicially constructed and lacks a statutory base. The reforms provide structure and direction but require legislative harmonization to fully stabilize the process.

It is argued that the SC could have explored other possible remedies, such as sending the resolution plan back to CoC to remedy the non-compliances and imposing penalties on responsible entities.

Embracing a similar test in the IBC would avert unjust denial of valid financial claims dressed only as penalties. It would further strengthen creditor participation in the committee of creditors, allowing more balanced participation in the collective settlement process.

While the BPSL-JSW is already forming into a landmark precedent in the IBC landscape, it risks creating a precedent, which undermines the revival aspect of IBC and has the possibility of deterring future CIRP proceedings.

The Kalyani Transco judgement has highlighted certain inefficiencies in the Code, calling for a revaluation of its provisions.