Droit à la déconnexion Bill of India: Right or Not?

[Priyasha and Saksham are students at Chanakya National Law University, Patna.]

On 5 December 2025, Member of Parliament Supriya Sule reintroduced the Right to Disconnect Bill (Bill) in the Lok Sabha, which aims to officially acknowledge that an employee has the right to refuse work-related communications outside of agreed working hours without repercussions that are inherently superimposed. Imagine a drained IT employee getting emails at midnight, termed urgent. A young lawyer gets the so-called work from home into weekends and holidays. This constant “telepressure” to respond to messages immediately via digital communication undermines both individual well-being and performance in terms of stress, burnout, and insomnia.

In accordance with this, the Bill forms its regulatory model based on three pillars that are interdependent: a centralized advisory body, a decentralized negotiation process, and a financial penalty for non-compliance. It creates an Employees’ Welfare Authority (Authority), requires charters negotiated at the company level specifying out-of-work time, sets compensation for overtime work after hours, and even suggests citizens’ digital detox centres.

However, the right to disconnect law could serve as a mere showpiece, due to its inherent defects. This post maintains that its effectiveness is severely undermined by structural flaws, such as the advisory capacity of the enforcement authority, jurisdictional gaps, and ambiguous employer liabilities. The presence of poor unionization and legislative loopholes further contributes to the operating failures that render the protections of the Bill mostly ineffective. This piece critically identifies these deficiencies and also offers specific reforms to close the gap between the aspirational goals of the law and the reality of the law as it applies to workers.

Structural Deficiencies and Loopholes of the Bill

First, the foundational reliance of the Bill on negotiation between employers and employees to define the charter is its greatest flaw. This process is clearly subordinated to the “diverse work cultures” and “competitive needs” of employers under the proviso to Clause 8(1) of the Bill. Further, Clause 9 mandates arriving at a mutual consensus between the employer and employee as to when the latter can be contacted during out-of-work hours. Even Clause 14 of the Bill that requires all charters to specifically state “normal out-of-work hours” till an agreement between the parties is reached is rendered irrelevant.

Since unionization in India is poor and power imbalances are widespread, this, in effect, transfers a fundamental right to the stronger party. Moreover, the Bill does not establish minimum standards for these charters, coupled with no union representation mandates. Clause 9(1) allows wide-open "mutually agreed" contact windows, in which the employer may effectively nullify the right contractually before its exercise. As a result, individual non-union workers are subjected to coercive agreements, and they are compelled to comply, or threat of ostracism by their peers.

Second, the suggested enforcement mechanism is both analytically weak and structurally flawed. The 1% flat penalty on total remuneration in Clause 19 is structurally ineffective as it can be a reasonable cost of doing business for large corporations and not as a penalty.

While the Bill includes provisions aimed at compelling specificity, such as requiring employers to expressly define and set individualized out-of-work hours, this penalty provision nonetheless still creates a risk. Only when an employer contacts an employee for a purpose not specified in this expansive clause does Clause 19 impose a penalty. Employers can still use language that is de facto broad but de jure specific to satisfy the latter part of the law. For example, without defining urgency, "normal out-of-work hours" could be defined as "any time outside an employee's core shift" or "as any time in case of operational urgency, as determined by the manager."

Third, Clauses 3 to 6 of the Bill provide for Authority, including ministers and secretaries as ex officio members, which makes it a mere de facto authority. It is a body of serving bureaucrats who meet on a periodic basis to deliberate on policy and not to adjudicate on individual disputes. It is restricted to research and recommendations. The fact that the Authority has the mandate of formulating a charter to stipulate the terms and conditions that will be negotiated between the employers and employees within one year is aspirational without a corresponding enforcement architecture.

Moreover, the system is based on a legislative gap, where no specific enforcement agency, appeals process, or funds to serve the workers exist. Importantly, the Bill provides a substantive right but does not specify any available forum, including a labour court, a specialized officer, or a tribunal within the Authority itself, by which an employee can bring a complaint.  Such a lack of personal redress cuts off the crucial connection between violation and victim restitution,  thus making the right virtually inactionable.

The Bill, which establishes under Clause 11, overtime entitlements at the normal wage rate, carries a risk of considerable overlap and interference with the Occupational Safety, Health and Working Conditions Code 2020, which provides overtime pay at twice the ordinary wage rate on work beyond 8 hours a day or 48 hours in the week, limited to 125 hours per quarter. Likewise, state shops and establishments laws, including Karnataka, which provides for twice the ordinary wages on 50 hours of overtime/ quarter limit, and Delhi on overtime up to 150 hours per year, place parallel limits on working hours and increased overtime pay, generating ambiguity on compliance not explicitly harmonized in the Bill.

Comparative Analysis of the Bill with Different Jurisdictions

An analysis of France’s droit a la deconnexion (2016) reveals the precautionary inadequacy of the Indian strategy. It enforces a positive duty of employers employing over 50 workers to bargain with unions to stipulate the modalities of disconnection. Importantly, in the event of unsuccessful negotiations, the employer should announce a policy unilaterally, hence imposing the responsibility to control the use of digital tools and observance of rest timelines. Moreover, the right has been incorporated into the French Labour Code, and infractions are adjudicated by the established system of labour courts, which offers a well-defined and integrated enforcement route. India, on the other hand, has a permissive model in which the responsibility of activating the right is vested in the employee negotiation, thus creating a right which could only be proclaimed on paper but abandoned in practice.

Australia’s 2024 Fair Work Amendment protects disconnection by justifying a refusal unless it is “unreasonable,” a standard adjudicated case-by-case to prevent employer abuse through categorical exemptions. Crucially, it is an enforceable workplace right with anti-retaliation remedies. The Bill in India does not have the reasonableness standards or anti-retaliation, which allows it to be nullified de facto by minor punishments. Law No. 83/2021 of Portugal puts a burden on the employer not to be in contact, instead of burdening the worker with establishing boundaries. This assumes employer overreach as opposed to worker complacency. The Bill in India needs to embrace this positive obligation model as opposed to a defensive right formulation.

Suggestions Towards an Actionable Framework

To correct the lack of balance in negotiation, the Bill should introduce a statutory default section, creating a rebuttable presumption that no work-related communication should be sent outside a minimum working-hour period on working days, weekly rest days, and public holidays. Any charter attempting to carve out exceptions regarding critical roles must substantiate such exceptions as fair, constrained, and recompensed. This sets a floor of protection that is non-negotiable and turns the tide of persuasion from employees demanding rest to the employers who need to justify intrusion.

Additionally, the Authority must be reconstituted with an independent judicial and expert member and must be given legal authority. Clause 5 of its mandate ought to be increased to discuss the appointment of right to disconnect officers at regional levels to reconcile complaints. The Authority must also act as an appellate court and be able to compensate the wronged employees and penalize them through conduct-based penalties. This change of an advisory panel into a regulatory institution is necessary to seal the gap in enforcement.

Further, Clause 19 should be substituted with a gradual, compensatory system of penalty. For first-time offences, corrective action directives together with mandatory compensatory payments to the affected employees should be imposed. In case of serious or frequent offences, fines in proportion to the gravity must exist. Other disciplinary measures, like temporary disqualification from government tenders, may be imposed in instances of wilful and systematic non-compliance. This strategy integrates restitution of victims with increasing deterrence, beyond just a one-size-fits-all fine.

To harmonize the existing labour codes with the Bill, the law must include a "non-obstante clause" that subordinates the current codes to negotiated charters (Clauses 8-9) and requires the Authority to publish coordinated directions to harmonize the overtime rate and time limits. Unless priority is clarified (e.g., through an overriding clause pursuant to rule-making powers in Clause 23) or through integration mechanisms, the employer risks the dual punishment of Clause 19 (1% remuneration fine under the Bill) and litigation risks, negating the work-life balance objectives of the Bill.

Finally, the scope of the definition of the Bill needs to be broadened by introducing an amendment to Clause 2 to include “any person engaged by the principal employer or because of an intermediary for the performance of work,” thereby covering gig and platform workers. 

Conclusion: Symbolism to Pragmatism

The Bill is a much-needed recognition, but procedurally ineffective, delegating the definition of the right to unequal negotiations, establishing an enforcement-lite body, and proposing insignificant penalties. India needs to go beyond symbolism and emulate other successful examples, such as France, by developing clear standards, strong adjudicatory bodies, and making the right realizable to all workers. By also posing disconnection as a privacy right instead of labour regulation per se, this raises its constitutional stature and justiciability. Then only can the law actually manage to unplug the digital leash and get people back in touch with their right to rest.