When the Dust Settles on Dr Sohail Malik: Cross-Organizational IC Jurisdiction and Enforcement Gap
- Disha Bais
- 8 hours ago
- 6 min read
[Disha is a student at Maharashtra National Law University, Nagpur.]
On 10 December 2025, a two-judge bench of the Supreme Court of India (SC), in Dr Sohail Malik v. Union of India and Another (Dr Sohail Malik), addressed a long-standing jurisdictional question under the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act 2013 (POSH Act 2013). The court held that an aggrieved woman can approach the internal committee (IC) of her own workplace to lodge a complaint against harassment by an employee of a different organization. Such IC constituted at the complainant’s workplace can exercise jurisdiction over the inquiry, even in the absence of a shared employment relationship. In holding so, the court rejected the contention that an aggrieved woman must confine her complaint to the IC of the respondent’s own workplace. Instead, the court emphasized the remedial and welfare-oriented nature of the statute, holding that access to redressal cannot be conditioned on organizational coincidence. While the ruling significantly advances complainant-centric interpretation, it also unsettles the existing compliance regime under the POSH Act 2013. As the dust begins to settle, several unresolved questions emerge.
Cross-Organizational Complaints under POSH Act 2013
The POSH Act 2013 does not expressly contemplate situations where the complainant and respondent belong to different establishments. However, its definitional framework is deliberately expansive. Section 2(o)(v) defines “workplace” to include not only traditional offices but also any place visited by an employee arising out of or during the course of employment. Similarly, Section 2(m) defines “respondent” as any person against whom a complaint has been made under Section 9.
In Dr Sohail Malik, an aggrieved woman initiated proceedings before the IC constituted at her workplace, following which the appellant was summoned to participate in the inquiry. The appellant questioned the competence of the IC and approached the Central Administrative Tribunal, contending that the complaint could only be inquired into by the IC established by his own department. This objection was rejected by both the Central Administrative Tribunal and, subsequently, the Delhi High Court. The appellant thereafter carried the challenge in appeal before the SC. Rejecting this contention, the SC observed, inter alia, that “keeping in mind the object behind the enactment of the POSH Act, if the aggrieved woman had to approach the IC constituted at the workplace of the ‘respondent’ for every third-party incident, it would fall short of the aforesaid object.”
The court further clarified that “the IC proceedings instituted in the aggrieved woman’s department can be considered the first-stage of inquiry which carries out a preliminary / fact-finding inquiry, after which the report of the IC may be sent to the employer / department of the ‘respondent’.” Depending on the findings recorded at this stage, the employer of the respondent may thereafter decide whether to initiate disciplinary proceedings under the applicable service rules. Where such proceedings are initiated, the IC constituted at the respondent’s workplace would function as the subsequent inquiring authority and may have regard to the report prepared by the IC at the complainant’s workplace.
This ruling resolves a question that had surfaced intermittently before High Courts, particularly in cases involving government officers, inter-departmental postings, and shared workplaces. While earlier decisions focused on the breadth of the term “workplace”, Dr Sohail Malik is among the first to squarely recognize cross-organizational IC jurisdiction as a matter of principle. Earlier decisions of the Bombay High Court had proceeded on the premise that Sections 2(f), 2(g), 4 and 6 of the POSH Act 2013 can be applied only where an employer-employee relationship existed. Dr Sohail Malik marks a clear departure from this narrow interpretation.
The Immediate Implications: Jurisdiction without Architecture
Jurisdiction without command
The SC’s interpretation clarifies who may inquire, but not who must act. Under Section 13 of the POSH Act 2013, disciplinary action can only be taken by the employer of the respondent. Consequently, where the employer of the respondent disagrees with the findings recorded by an IC constituted at another workplace, the recommendations made by the complainant’s IC do not have binding force across organizational boundaries.
This enforcement deficit is not cured by even the appellate remedy under Section 18. An appeal against the recommendations or their non-implementation operates only ex post and on a case-specific basis, and does not address the absence of a binding mechanism to ensure that an employer acts upon findings recorded by an IC constituted outside its organization. The High Court of Kerala has also held that while the complaints committee is deemed to be an inquiry authority and its report is treated as an inquiry report under the applicable service rules, the discretion to determine and impose the consequential disciplinary action continues to vest in the employer.
At the edges of procedure and proof
An IC exercising jurisdiction over a respondent from another organisation faces potential constraints at the evidentiary stage. While Section 11 of the POSH Act 2013 empowers the IC to conduct an inquiry, it does not confer obligatory powers to compel the cross-examination, the production of documents or attendance of witnesses who, in cross-organizational complaints, would be governed by another employer’s service rules. In the absence of cooperation from the respondent’s employer, the IC’s ability to effectively marshal evidence in such cases remains constrained.
Reporting ambiguities
Section 21 of the POSH Act 2013 requires every employer to include details of sexual harassment complaints and their disposal in its annual report. In cross-organizational complaints, however, the statute does not delineate whether the obligation to report lies with the employer of the complainant, the employer of the respondent, or both. Dr Sohail Malik did not address this reporting asymmetry. The absence of regulatory guidance creates a compliance vacuum, risking inconsistent disclosure.
This uncertainty compounds pre-existing weaknesses in POSH reporting, underscored by empirical data. Although mandatory disclosure was intended as a key accountability mechanism to enable oversight and evaluation of the statute's implementation, more than a decade since its enactment there remains no central, publicly accessible repository collating such data. Instead, disclosures are scattered across individual employer reports, often in inaccessible or non-standardized formats, making it difficult to identify industry-wide trends or assess compliance and, crucially, rendering cross-organisational complaints virtually invisible in annual reports.
Risk of inter-employer conflict
The judgment creates a coordination obligation without providing a guiding framework. While the IC constituted at the complainant’s workplace is permitted to conduct the inquiry, the power to act upon those findings vests in the respondent’s employer, creating fragmentation of obligations. If the respondent’s employer disputes the inquiry process or the report, the statute does not provide any mechanism to address such disputes. Nor does the appellate remedy under Section 18 contemplate inter-employer disputes of this nature. In the absence of a statutory dispute-resolution mechanism, challenges are likely to be pursued through litigation, thereby increasing judicial intervention at the enforcement stage.
Filling the Vacuum: The Way Forward
The decision in Dr Sohail Malik marks an important evolution in POSH jurisprudence by aligning jurisdiction with the realities of modern workplaces, where inter-organizational interaction is a norm. However, as the foregoing analysis demonstrates, the expansion of jurisdiction has not been accompanied by an enforcement architecture. In this enforcement vacuum, the role of District Officer (DO) can assume renewed relevance.
Under Section 20 of the POSH Act, DO is tasked with monitoring timely submission of annual report furnished by the IC or local committee and taking necessary measures to create awareness regarding prevention of sexual harassment. Read together with Section 22 of the POSH Act, which requires employers to disclose number of cases filed and details of their disposal in the annual reports, these provisions create a compliance interface that can be utilized to address the gaps exposed by Dr Sohail Malik.
Various SOPs and directives issued by state governments have already empowered DOs to handle complaints and ensure compliance across their respective regions. Therefore, they can potentially act as a coordinating point between organizations in cross-organisational complaints. The DO could facilitate communication between employers and inter-employer disputes, if any and cooperation on matters of production of witness and documents in inquiry.
However, reporting obligations in cross-organizational complaints would need explicit clarification. For instance, a workable design could be: the complainant’s employer can report initiation and inquiry and respondent’s employer can report the disciplinary action or closure of the complaint. This would improve visibility of such complaints in annual disclosures - an area already weakened by fragmented reporting.
Conclusion
The decision in Dr Sohail Malik reflects judicial recognition that modern workplaces are porous and interconnected, and that rigid organizational boundaries cannot dictate access to redressal. By expanding the jurisdiction of the IC, the Supreme Court has prioritized substantive justice over formalistic limits. Yet, as with many transformative rulings, the limits of adjudication without corresponding legislative or institutional support stand exposed. Until the procedural and enforcement gaps in the POSH Act 2013 are addressed, the framework would remain merely ornamental.
The judgment opens the door to cross-organizational redressal; whether meaningful enforcement follows will determine if the promise of Dr Sohail Malik endures. The dust may be settling, but the architecture beneath still demands careful rebuilding.
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