Opening the Door on One Side and Bolting It on the Other: SEBI’s Consultation Paper on Strengthening Governance of MIIs

[Saanvi is a student at Gujarat National Law University.]
Stock exchanges, clearing corporations and depositories, together called market infrastructure institutions (MIIs), are not ordinary companies. They run the plumbing of the securities market, and they also act as first-line regulators. The law has therefore always been careful about who sits on their governing boards and who runs their most sensitive functions.
On 9 September 2026, SEBI issued a consultation paper (CP) titled “Strengthening Governance of MIIs”. Part A of the CP proposes to relax, in a limited way, the bar on persons connected with trading members, clearing members and depository participants from sitting on MII boards. In its Part B, the CP proposes a standard operating procedure (SOP) for the qualifications and experience required of four key managerial personnel: the Chief Technology Officer (CTO), the Chief Information Security Officer (CISO), the Compliance Officer (CO) and the Chief Risk Officer (CRiO). This post looks at both parts and at a few drafting points that stakeholders may want to raise.
How the Bar on Members Sitting on MII Boards Came About
After the demutualisation of stock exchanges, the representation of trading members and clearing members on exchange boards was progressively reduced. It was first capped at one-third of the board, then at one-fourth. The Bimal Jalan Committee on the Review of Ownership and Governance of MIIs went further and recommended that no trading or clearing member, irrespective of the exchange on which it operates, should sit on the board of any stock exchange. The Securities and Exchange Board of India’s (SEBI) Board approved this on 2 April 2012, and it was later codified in the SECC Regulations. The Depositories and Participants Regulations 2018 (D&P Regulations) carry a parallel rule for depository participants.
Regulation 23(6) of the SECC Regulations provides that no trading member or clearing member, or their associates and agents, shall be on the governing board of any recognised stock exchange or clearing corporation. Regulation 23(7) then supplies a deeming rule. A person who is a director in an entity that is itself a trading or clearing member, or that has an associate which is one, is treated as a trading or clearing member. Regulation 23(9) requires the exchange to monitor compliance continuously, so that a director does not become associated with a member after appointment. Regulation 24(9), (10) and (12) of the D&P Regulations does the same for depositories.
Regulation 23(7) already contains a carve-out. A director of a public financial institution or a bank is not caught if the institution is in the public sector, has no identifiable ultimate promoter, has a public sector promoter, or has well diversified shareholding, even if the institution or its associate is a trading or clearing member. A second proviso protects independent directors of certain associates of public sector banks.
Why SEBI Considers the Deeming Rule Too Wide
The CP says MIIs have found it hard to identify suitable candidates, especially Public Interest Directors. The reason lies in the deeming rule. A person on the board of any company becomes ineligible if some other entity in the same group is a trading member, clearing member or depository participant, however remote the connection. Conglomerates and holding companies often have several subsidiaries that run behind internal walls and do not interfere with one another's operations. CP points out that a banking group today may have an insurance arm, a broking house and an asset management company. Excluding a director of one group company because a sister concern is a broker seems disproportionate. The stated aim is to encourage the flow of expertise and talent into MIIs.
What the Proposed Amendment Does
The proposal is narrow. The existing carve-out for public sector banks and financial institutions is to be extended to directors of companies that have trading, clearing or depository participant associates but have well diversified shareholding. A company has well diversified shareholding if no shareholder other than public sector shareholders, acting alone or with persons acting in concert, directly or indirectly owns 10% or more of the stake, or controls the company, or holds shares carrying 10% or more of the voting rights. For example if the shareholders holding 10% or more are in the public sector, the company is deemed to have well diversified shareholding.
The same change is to be made in Regulation 24(10) of the D&P Regulations. The draft amendment to Regulation 23(7) of the SECC Regulations is set out in the paper. It marks the changes to the existing proviso in strikethrough and underline.
Drafting Points on Part A That Deserve Attention
Reading the draft against the existing text raises a few questions.
The first concerns the deletion in the existing proviso. The current text protects directors of banks or financial institutions that have “no identifiable ultimate promoter” or whose ultimate promoter is in the public sector. In the draft, those words are struck off and replaced by the well diversified shareholding test. SEBI through the CP describes the change as an extension of the carve-out. Read literally, though, the draft could narrow it for some institutions. A bank with no identifiable promoter but a private shareholder holding 12% would be exempt today but would fail the 10% test. SEBI should clarify whether that consequence is intended.
The second concerns who is protected. SEBI through the CP discusess about companies “which have associates” as trading or clearing members. The draft proviso, however, ends by saying that the person is not deemed a member if the institution, “companies with well diversified shareholding or its associate” is a trading or clearing member. On a literal reading, a widely held company that is itself a trading member would fall within the exemption. That would go well beyond the conglomerate problem the paper describes, and it is hard to reconcile with the purpose of Regulation 23(6). The final text should probably confine the relief to the group-company situation.
The third concerns the nature of the safeguard. The paper relies on the internal walls between group entities as its justification, but the draft does not require any. Eligibility turns only on the shareholding pattern of the company where the director sits. It says nothing about whether the director also sits on the board of the associate that is a trading member, or whether recusal is required when matters affecting that associate come before the MII board. Since Regulation 23(9) already places a continuous monitoring duty on exchanges, a recusal or disclosure condition would be a modest addition.
The fourth is a practical point about that monitoring duty. A 10% holding can arise through a market purchase, a preferential allotment or a change in the group of persons acting in concert. The MII would have to track the shareholding of every company from which a director is drawn. The final regulation should say who bears the burden of declaring a change and how quickly.
Two smaller points also arise. The 10% figure appears to have been chosen for consistency with other regulatory thresholds, but the paper does not explain the choice. Shareholders in the public sector are excluded from the count altogether, so a public sector entity could hold a very large block without disqualifying the company. That may be defensible, but it is a policy choice and the paper does not say so.
Part B: Standardising the Qualifications of Four Critical Officers
The second part is more straightforward. At present, SEBI approves the appointment and removal of the Managing Director and the Executive Directors of an MII. The Governing Board handles the CTO, CISO, CO and CRiO on the recommendation of the Nomination and Remuneration Committee. There is no standardised framework for the qualification, experience, skill-set or certification of these four officers. SEBI describes them as crucial to an MII's public interest mandate of putting technological resilience, cyber-security, compliance and risk management ahead of commercial considerations.
After discussions in its Technology Advisory Committee, the High Powered Steering Committee on Cyber Security and the SMAC, SEBI proposes that each MII’s Governing Board approve an SOP for these roles. The Board is to take into account the inputs of the relevant statutory committee: the Standing Committee on Technology for the CTO and CISO, the Regulatory Oversight Committee for the CO, and the Risk Management Committee for the CRiO. The paper also proposes that any vacancy be filled expeditiously, with advance planning where a vacancy is foreseen, and in any case within three months. It separately asks whether MIIs should appoint deputies for these roles.
Points to Consider on Part B
The paper leaves the substance of the SOP to each MII. It does not state any minimum qualification, years of experience or certification. Because every Governing Board will approve its own SOP, the standards can differ from one MII to another. A market participant would reasonably expect the CISO of one exchange and the CISO of another to meet a comparable bar. Since SEBI approves the MD and EDs directly but not these officers, it may want to prescribe baseline criteria itself, or at least review the SOPs once they are adopted.
The three-month vacancy period is also worded softly. Paragraph 19 says the position "may be filled" within three months. Some commentators have described this as a firm timeline, but the paper's language reads as directory. If SEBI wants compliance, the final text should use mandatory wording and say what happens if the period is exceeded, for example whether an interim appointment is permitted and who may act in the meantime.
The question on deputies is closely tied to that timeline. Naming a deputy in advance would reduce the risk of a gap, particularly for the CISO and CRiO roles, where a lapse in oversight can matter at once. There is a cost, since a deputy of the right seniority adds to the cost base, and smaller MIIs may find it harder. A workable middle course would be to require a designated officer who can act in the interim.
Conclusion
The two parts pull in different directions. Part A loosens a rule that has been in place since 2012 so that MII boards can draw on a larger pool of directors. Part B prescribes eligibility standards and succession planning for four senior officers. The common thread is SEBI’s concern that MIIs get good people in the right positions, but each part needs work before it is finalised. For Part A, the deletion of the “no identifiable promoter” limb, the literal reach of the proviso and the absence of any recusal condition are the main points. For Part B, the lack of baseline criteria and the soft wording on vacancies are the main ones. It is to be seen how markets reacts to the CP and how SEBI takes these comments.