The author's submission is that Tejas J Shah is rightly decided and useful for correcting a specific adjudicatory error, but that its doctrinal contribution is narrower than a first reading suggests.

The blog puts forth the idea of having a statutory synergy threshold test with a 75% equity ownership trigger, based on value-flow modelling, which would facilitate comprehensive resolutions and help in unlocking the value trapped in India's 300+ group-linked ​‍​‌‍​‍‌NPAs.

This article argues that the Supreme Court’s decision undermines the rescue-oriented objective of the IBC and examines potential solutions adopted by major jurisdictions worldwide.

The central thesis: India has a statutory answer for retail investors stranded inside a single insolvent asset-holding company; it has simply never been asked whether that answer was built wide enough to reach this particular investor.

Until Parliament and Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India catch up, TSP resolutions, as well as those of other natural resources, will sit in the gap that the Supreme Court has just defined.

This piece argues that the manner in which Section 240C has been drafted is more than just an ordinary administrative delegation and can lead to the delegation of the essential legislative function.

The interdisciplinary blind spot of merging insolvency law, AI ethics, and constitutional due process asks for a thorough examination, as NCLT bottlenecks at the same time lower the capability of value ​‍​‌‍​‍‌maximization.

This article argues that, instead of focusing on who owns each individual component, the IBC should recognise the corporate debtor’s commercial interest in the AI asset stack.

This article argues that insolvency law must respond to trademark title disputes through contractual structuring within the resolution plan.

The authors intend to analyse the CIIRP framework by positioning it against the US DIP model and examining the institutional shortcomings.

The JetAirways proceedings illustrated a legal vacuum which is yet to be addressed.

The protections conferred on CIRP participants through Section 21(2) show that Part III’s silence creates an arbitrary distinction between two classes of insolvent that Article 14 cannot sustain.

This piece aims to examine the practical consequences of leaving the concept of “treatment” undefined and proposes reforms that may help give substantive effect to the protection contemplated under Regulation 38A.

The real question is not whether homebuyers belong within the IBC. It is why insolvency law has become the institution through which failures of real estate regulation are increasingly corrected, and how long a regulator can keep failing before the statute quietly covering for it is mistaken for the solution.

The IBBI has, in the deferred commencement window, a rare opportunity to get this right before a single CIIRP is filed.

The nil valuation of contingent claims under the IBC is operationally convenient, judicially endorsed, and now sits atop a firm statutory footing after the 2026 Amendment, but it remains unjustified in its current form.

Real systemic growth occurs when fairness is not compromised to achieve commercial speed.

PPIRP’s record of sixteen admissions in four years is not a marketing problem, and the 2026 Act’s improvements do not resolve it.

The reference in Surana presents an opportunity for the Supreme Court to reaffirm the underlying philosophy of personal insolvency law.

The Supreme Court's judgment in Alpha Corp has been widely read as a homebuyer-protective ruling; that reading is accurate as far as it goes.

The decision in Ujaas Energy highlights the inherent tension between finality and fairness in the IBC framework.

The effectiveness of CIIRP post-Amendment will ultimately depend upon preventing disruptive pre-insolvency enforcement that frustrates restructuring efforts.

Until the three-judge bench rules, the operative position is Surana’s bifurcation, reached by a route the statute does not actually require.

The IBC was never meant to be a code of private enforcement. It is a statute of public restructuring, where creditor control is legitimate because it is bound by statute and under adjudicatory supervision. CIIRP diminishes the first moment of that supervision and must therefore heighten the requirements of notice and objection rights.