The CIIRP procedure, aiming for efficiency and speed, creates a judicial vacuum which can potentially be used by the corporate debtor to dissipate assets. The 30–day mandatory notice period, removes the possibility of preventive judicial orders like asset freeze that have been proven essential and necessary as per UNCITRAL’s ATR recommendations for asset preservation. This judicial gap allows debtors to exploit specifically FEMA provisions for irreversible asset transfer.

This article suggests a hierarchical framework for debt classification under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code 2016 (IBC) wherein company law constraints function as threshold gatekeepers that determine whether a legally enforceable debt can arise at all, while substance-over-from analysis is put to a secondary role assessing the character of obligations that have already crystallised in law.

The omission of going concern sales aims to enhance the efficacy of the resolution process by limiting the assessment of commercial viability to the corporate insolvency resolution process stage, while keeping the liquidation process limited to dissolution. However, it fails to take account of the implications of the same, such as the loss of goodwill and employment.

The Aircrafts Objects Act safeguards the rights of global lessors without eroding the resilience of airline companies to revive under the IBC 2016. 

While the CLRP framework presents itself an progressive endeavor to introduce flexibility and efficiency into the insolvency regime, its current form contains several flaws that go to the root of the matter, compromising its efficacy.

The new amendment brings changes that are certainly going to be effective for the IBC. However, we must also not overlook the on-ground problems that might be created due to the changes in the code.

It bears no further reiteration that a proceeding under Sections 241–242 cannot be stifled by the commencement of CIRP or the approval of a resolution plan.

The airline insolvency framework in India is still in need of a solution. The evolution has been more of a trade of one problem for another.

[ Piyush is a student at National Law University Jodhpur. ] Almost a decade after the introduction of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code 2016 ( IBC ), it has been generally lauded to be a far more successful method  of debt resolution compared to the earlier systems. However, procedural hiccups and substantive ambiguities do remain in the framework, affecting successful and timely debt resolution. The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Amendment Bill 2025  ( Amendment Bill ) aims to f

Abstentions should neither be automatically counted nor entirely disregarded within the CoC. A conditional inclusion model, which allows initial inclusion but limits the influence of repeated or strategic abstention, offers the most balanced reform under the IBC.

The 2025 amendment is an attempt to draw a line in the murky sand between resolution and liquidation. Ideal value maximization lies not in how fast we close a company, but in how effectively we give it a chance to recover while it still can.

The 2025 amendment to Section 33 marks a significant and pragmatic shift in India’s insolvency regime by providing a structured "second life" for CIRP. However, its success hinges on fiduciary responsibility of creditors, and effective institutional capacity to implement the provision faithfully.

The Supreme Court's ruling in EPCC v. Matix Fertilisers upholds the integrity of corporate capital law within the IBC framework by restating the crucial differentiation between creditor debt and shareholder investment.

A new, principle-grounded taxonomy is needed to maneuver through the new territory by logically incorporating the claims of digital assets into the hierarchy of Section 53 of the code.

The contradiction between moratorium theory and interest accrual practice represents more than a technical legal gap. With the IBC Amendment Bill 2025 currently pending before the Parliament, the opportunity for meaningful reform arises.

The balancing or “sliding scale” approach in Sequana is necessarily indeterminate, but such flexibility is preferable in the sphere of directors’ duties.

It is time for tax laws to stop dragging MSMEs back into the quicksand if insolvency is supposed to provide them with a new beginning.

The IBC amendment marks a significant step in India’s insolvency law. By introducing CIIRP, Parliament has signaled a shift towards even greater creditor empowerment and flexibility. CIIRP’s shorter timelines and creditor-led design mirror global best practices (akin to pre-packaged restructurings), potentially speeding up resolutions and preserving value.

The ‘nil’ payment paradox, starkly illustrated in the case of Vadraj Cement Limited, is more than just a procedural flaw; it is a fundamental breach of the very promise made by IBC upon its enactment, which is the revival of businesses and equitable treatment of all the stakeholders. 

The NCLAT’s ruling, though doctrinally clear, exposes a structural vulnerability: the potential for disguised preferences routed through third parties. India’s insolvency regime must evolve beyond formalism.

IBC gets very few opportunities to realize its true objectives, that of revival of financially distressed entities and their continuity as a going concern. In order to prevent the IBC from turning into a debt-recovery tool, it is essential to re-evaluate the Bill in light of the principles upon which the IBC is premised.

The Bill's establishment of group insolvency and cross-border insolvency frameworks is significant as it illustrates India's evolution as a sophisticated player in the global insolvency sector.

India lacks a formal mechanism to address cross-border insolvency and restructuring. In practice, resolution of such matter’s hinges on ad hoc court-to-court cooperation or the recognition of foreign judgments under the Civil Procedure Code 1908.

The need of the hour is a legislative and administrative framework that balances conflicting objectives. India's dual objectives of preventing financial misconduct and creating an insolvency regime that is investment-friendly can only be fully supported by such an integrated approach.