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The Designation of CEOs as SBOs: An Analysis of “Control” under the Companies Act 2013

Malavika Krishnan
Mar 17
6 min read

[Malavika is a student at National Law School of India University.]


In December 2024, the Registrar of Companies (ROC) designated the CEOs of LinkedIn Corporation and Microsoft Corporation, Ryan Roslansky and Satya Nadella respectively, as significant beneficial owners (SBOs) of LinkedIn Technology under Sections 89 and 90 of the Companies Act 2013 and the Companies (Significant Beneficial Owners) Rules 2014 (SBO Rules).


This article critiques the convoluted reasoning of the LinkedIn ROC order. It argues that the ROC’s extension of the control test to prima facie include CEOs is a broad interpretation that does not align with the narrow understanding of control under the subjective test, under which CEOs are considered SBO only in exceptional cases. The article argues that the interpretation of the terms “control” in the Indian context is restricted to narrow circumstances. The article also conducts a comparative examination of various legislative frameworks abroad and argues that in the Indian context, a CEO would not be designated an SBO, barring certain exceptional circumstances. Finally, the article critiques the convoluted reasoning in the LinkedIn case, whose ratio has often been misunderstood.


The Indeterminate Scope of “Control” and “Significant Ownership” under the Subjective Test


There are two tests to identify an SBO: the objective test and the subjective test. While the objective test looks at numerical thresholds, the subjective test examines whether the person exercises or has the right to exercise significant influence or control. As argued in this section, the interpretation of control under the subjective test is narrow but lacks sufficient clarity as to specific cases.


Control is broadly defined under the Companies Act 2013 as including the right to appoint majority of the directors, or to control management or policy decisions.  Such control may be direct or indirect. Further, it may be derived from shareholding or management rights, shareholder or voting agreements, or in any other manner. Under the SBO Rules, where no natural person is identified as exercising control or significant influence, the significant beneficial owner is the relevant natural person who holds the position of senior managing official. Thus, there is no bright-line test to determine control, with the present framework providing only a broad overview. However, the drafting choice of the legislators, who opted for the phrase “management or policy decisions” over “affairs and management”, indicates their intention to keep the scope of the section narrow.


Does “Control” Extend to the Control Exercised by CEOs?


In the aftermath of the LinkedIn case, there was great debate as to whether the control exercised by a CEO in general administration and management of a company falls under the definition of “control” or significant influence. 


In practice, CEOs do enjoy a certain amount of autonomy in exercising their powers. Empirical evidence reveals that when there is no majority shareholder or controlling director in a company, the CEOs have the freedom to manage the company with minimal interference. While in theory, CEOs are accountable to Directors, where no director has controlling power, the safeguard fails due to the problem of fragmented interests. However, as critics point out, CEOs lack any ownership interest in companies. In this context, I undertake a comparative overview of the definition of control.


The extreme position is taken in the US. Under the Corporate Transparency Act, senior officers of a company, individuals with the authority to appoint or remove senior officers of a reporting company, and important decision-makers are designated CEOs. Thus, CEOs are SBOs plainly by virtue of their position. 


On the other hand, in the UK, CEOs are not prima facie considered SBOs. CEOs are designated SBOs only in exceptional circumstances. The first is when their role deviates materially from its general understanding; and second, if it forms one of several opportunities to exercise significant influence or control. 


The FATF framework takes a middle approach, recommending a senior managing official may be identified as an SBO where no natural person is identified in that role. The underlying purpose here is to identify the person behind a chain of ownership or even indirect control.


The statutory framework in India seems to draw inspiration from the UK and FATF’s position. Under the Limited Liability Partnership (SBO) Rules 2023, CEOs are designated as SBOs only in case of PIVs, evidencing that the legislative intention in India is to confine the cases where CEOs are treated as SBOs. Further, Explanation I, Rule 2 of the SBO Rules brings the  aforementioned FATF recommendation into operation.


Thus, one may conclude that under the Companies Act 2013, CEOs are not automatically designated as SBOs, barring exceptional circumstances, namely, (i) when a senior official is not identifiable; (ii) in case of PIVs, and (iii) fulfilment of the subjective test for reasons beyond one’s role as a CEO.


Applying This Definition to the LinkedIn Case


The ROC designated both Nadella and Roslansky as SBOs. As shown in this section, however, there was a lack of legislative clarity in the ROC order, with the ROC using a combination of the the UK and US tests.


The ROC held Roslansky to be an SBO on two progs. First, as the Global CEO and “leader” of LinkedIn Corporation, exercised or had the right to exercise indirect “control” or “significant influence” in LinkedIn India.  It was held that his designation as the Global CEO indicated his sphere of influence. Secondly, the corporate structure of LinkedIn corporation was unique. As President, Roslansky was the senior most officer of LinkedIn Corporation. Even Directors of the Company were subordinate to him, being only Vice-Presidents. 


The ROC extended the chain of reporting to Nadella, the CEO of Microsoft, as Roslanksy reported to him post LinkedIn’s acquisition by Microsoft. Similar to Roslansky, the ROC gave two alternative reasons to designate Nadella as an SBO. First, as per the by-laws of Microsoft, he was a CEO with a power of “general” supervision. Second, the ROC noted that Nadella was the also the Chairman of the Board of directors. Hence, he was not subordinate to the Board or de facto under its supervision. 


Thus, the ROC switched between reasoning that de facto recognises CEOs as SBOs, and highlighting extenuating circumstances. This convoluted reasoning has led to confusion as regards the exact ratio of the case, with most understanding it to mean that any CEO may be designated as an SBO. 


However, as analysed in the previous sections, this broad interpretation does not align with the overall legislative framework. It may not serve the purpose of the maintaining the register of SBOs, which aims to uncover the real individual hidden behind complex structures and chains of corporate vehicles. The designation of CEOs as SBOs, in truth, allows the ROC to trace only the chain of companies or legal persons having control or ownership over a particular company, as it is their contractual link to the company that identifies them. The consequence of the ROC’s broad interpretation is that a person may file the CEO of a company as an SBO as a red herring, to conceal their control over a company. It would also create excessive compliance requirements for foreign companies, with subsidiaries in India. Thus, it would make sense to restrict the designation of CEOs as SBOs only as a fall-back mechanism, when no real person in control can be identified.


In any case, it may be noted that there was no other person on the board of Microsoft with greater than a 10% shareholding, and no one else who could be designated as an SBO. Further, the “nominee” directors of LinkedIn India were also directors of LinkedIn Corporation, which meant that they could not be designated as SBOs either. Thus, clearly, this was a scenario that fell under Explanation II of the SBO Rules. Had the ROC identified CEOs as the SBOs on the basis that no other natural person could be identified, the reasoning would have been sound under the legislative framework.


Conclusion


This article argued that the legislative interpretation of control, being narrower in scope, would be limited towards recognition of CEOs as SBOs in exceptional cases, namely, where no natural person can be identified, where the company is a PIV, or where the CEO exercises control other than what is the normal administrative function of a CEO. On this ground, it shows that while the designation of Ryan and Nadella as SBOs may be sound practically, given that no other SBO could be identified, the reasoning employed to reach that conclusion was flawed and convoluted, which did not align with the narrower scope of control under the Companies Act 2013.

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